Behavior Analysis of Together-Conspired Bidding Based on the Evolutionary Game

Based on the “replication dynamics” ideas, the paper establishes asymmetric evolutionary game model of together-conspired bidding using evolutionary game theory, and obtains its evolutionary stable strategy under the present governmental supervision that surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder’s proportion is periodic fluctuation of the center stability, explains the reason why together-conspired bidding is difficult to be prevented effectively. In order to find the decisive factor of the evolutionary drift, further investigation shows that the evolutionary drift is converged to the different evolutionary stable properties when evolution conditions change, such as the supervision target, supervision strength. Through the analysis to the punishment extent on surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder, the conclusion is arrived that the strength of punishment and execution on the surround-bidder can effectively control together-conspired bidding, which provides the theoretical basis to governmental supervision department for the management and research work on together-conspired bidding in the construction market.